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Reading the Dead

A Black Feminist Poethical Reading of Global Capital

Facing the mountain we speak with our dead so that they will reveal to us in their word the path down which our veiled faces should turn. The drums rang out and in the voice of the earth our pain spoke and our history spoke. “For everyone, everything,” say our dead. Until it is so, there will be nothing for us. —Zapatista National Liberation Army, “Second Declaration of the Lacandona Jungle,” June 1994

In the conflicts caused by the territorial expansion of “junior” mining companies . . . different ways of seeing and experiencing the world, namely use value and exchange value, are pitted against each other. From the Rio Bravo to Tierra del Fuego, disputes are arising because of the incompatibility between short-term speculative mining activity and the existential long-term approach of local and regional populations; between mining on the one hand and farming, silvo-pasture and fishing on the other; between the limited generation of jobs leading to local social disparities and the social, cultural, economic and environmental backwardness caused when the company withdraws. —Saúl Vicente Vásquez, “Study on the Extractive Industries in Mexico and the Situation of Indigenous Peoples in the Territories in Which Those Industries Are Located”

Item 8 of the 12th Session of UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, “Future Work of the Permanent Forum, Including Matters of the Economic and Social Council and Emerging Issues,” dealt with the impact of mining upon Indigenous peoples. The documents discussed included a commis-

sioned study on Indigenous protests against the mining industry in Mexico.¹ At first, the study seems to support Indigenous people's arguments that, in Mexico (as in many other countries), public interest now means the interests of global capital. It acknowledges that Mexico's recent mining boom is part of a "global trend," as countries, in Latin America in particular, have reformed their "laws and administrative regulations to encourage and attract capital for investment in mining."² It also quotes the assertion of Mexico's Ministry of Economic Affairs that "mining in Mexico is currently the third most successful industry in terms of attracting investment—behind the oil industry and automotive and electronic exports."³ It describes how the notions of public interest and priority undermine "the preferential right that the Constitution gives to Indigenous peoples, who are unlikely to have the financial and technical resources to outbid large multinational or national corporations, should they attempt to do so. It also nullifies their right to consultation and consent as guaranteed in the international legal instruments signed by Mexico."⁴ This study could be instrumental to Indigenous and rural people's legal battles. It could. And it might. Unfortunately, however, its analysis of Indigenous insurgencies against the Mexican state and the Canadian mining companies fails to articulate their political significance. For when explaining the core of the conflict, the author chooses to construct it as an effect of cultural difference: "Differences of culture and ways of thinking among the actors (the states, the mining companies, the communities, etc.)," it argues, "represent a great challenge not only to dialogue and ad hoc negotiations in conflict situations but also to the construction of a common interest, which is the basis for the formulation of public policy."⁵

Listening to the presentation I was intrigued by how organized protest against land expropriation can be explained as an actualization of cultural difference. What I do in this chapter is not so much to answer this question but to outline an approach that describes Indigenous peoples' protests as what they are: the articulation of a political subject emerging against the colonial apparatus for land and labor expropriation that has been so crucial for the accumulation of capital.

Returning to my question: it is no surprise that Indigenous people's organized protest in Mexico is described as expressions of different set of values. For since at least the 1980s, cultural difference has been the basis for demands from social (racial and gendered-sexual) subaltern subjects precisely because it allows for the delimitation of the social trajectory of exclusion and the articulation of the particular subjectivity emerging from it. Inclusion strategies, based on recognition, such as diversity and multiculturalist

programs, as well as the syntax and lexicon of second- and third-generation human rights, borrow from social scientific knowledge—the anthropological studies that deploy the notion of cultural difference and the sociological analytics of exclusion, which does no more than to recount the many ways in which states fail to fulfill their task of promoting social equality (causing social harm, social exclusion, poverty, environmental damages—which comes with their right to sovereignty over the territory). Put differently, the human rights framework, national constitutions, and social scientific tools available to support demands for the realization of these rights rehearse the same liberal grammar. In them, items of the arsenal of raciality, such as the notion of cultural difference, operate as always, as tools of political-symbolic violence, by occluding of the juridic-economic relevance of Indigenous and other anticolonial and anticapitalist protests by transforming them into actualizations of fixed (“traditional”) beliefs of the past, instead of reading them as expressions of an Indigenous “radical resurgent present,” to borrow Leanne Simpson’s phrase.⁶

In this chapter I deploy a Black feminist poethical reading method designed to capture Indigenous insurgencies as anticolonial and racial critiques of global state-capital. Ignoring the onto-epistemological pillars—namely, separability, determinacy, and sequentiality—actualized in social categories and concepts that compose the available critical arsenal, I foreground the fundamentally juridic-economic character of these confrontations. The inspiration for this exercise comes from Indigenous and rural anticolonial and anticapitalist protests against the return to an economic development program based on mega-agricultural projects and natural resource exploitation. Let me just mention three: the Zapatistas (Mexico), Idle No More movement (Canada),⁷ and the Encontro Unitario dos Trabalhadores, Trabalhadoras e Povos do Campo, das Aguas, e das Florestas (United Meeting of the Male and Female Workers and the Peoples from the Countryside, the Waters, and the Forests) (Brazil).⁸ My main concern is how, because of the onto-epistemological assumptions guiding our critical work, these Indigenous and rural insurrections against state-capital and their demands for justice are immediately translated into actualizations of their cultural difference/identity without political and transformative force.

Toward a framing of justice consistent with these radical challenges to state-capital, the Black feminist poethical praxis aims to contribute to a vision of justice grounded in the view that the only acceptable response to the radical (not metaphorical) call for decolonialization is the demand for nothing less than the return of the total value expropriated from and yielded by

the productive capacity of Native lands and slave bodies.⁹ Framed as a Black feminist poethical contribution to the critique of global capital—that is, the present figuring of the state-capital duo—what follows is nothing more than a sketch, with each section merely touching the core of the many moves necessary to begin. Even if only as an outline, it presents a method that not only does not repeat but also dissolves the effects of existing critical tools. Not surprisingly, the itinerary is rather simple: I begin with an example of this translation of Indigenous political expressions into actualizations of cultural difference and close with an outline—actually more like notes—on reading the dead as a method for the critique of global capital.

Notes on a Raw Materialist Method

The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is **sensation**. That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**. The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called **appearance**. I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its **matter**, but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the **form** of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us a posteriori, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind a priori, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.
—Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

For everything is a plenum, which makes all matter interconnected. In a plenum, every motion has some effect on distant bodies, in proportion to their distance. For each body is affected, not only by those in contact with it, and in some way feels the effects of everything that happens to them, but also, through them, it feels the effects of those in contact with the bodies with which it is itself immediately in contact. From this it follows that this communication extends to any distance whatsoever. As a result, every body is affected by everything that happens in the universe, to such an extent that he who sees all can read in each thing what happens everywhere, and even what has happened or what will happen, by observing in the present what is remote in time as well as in space.
—G. W. Leibniz, *Philosophical Essays*

When setting up his transcendental aesthetics at the beginning of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Immanuel Kant's first move is to displace The Thing and

Matter. Both are disavowed in the statement that knowledge/science does not concern The Thing in-itself, but only phenomena, already an effect of the pure intuitions of time and space. My intention here is not to dispute Kant's claims or advance a critique of his program. The radical move here is refusal: refusal to engage, to maintain thinking within the limits of the very distinction between matter and form, which cannot but request the onto-epistemological pillars of modern thought in order to assemble its grounds. Taking off with the given distinction between the substratum (*materia prima*), without seeking to capture it with the attributes of the subject (such as life or self-determination), I move to figure Matter as The Thing. Of course, I am writing with a good number of early and contemporary philosophers and theorists, many inspired by Gilles Deleuze, who will go unnamed. My inspiration is not Deleuze but Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's description of the plenum.

The method I am after begins and stays with matter and the possibility of imaging the world as *corpus infinitum*. I am borrowing, and as I borrow I am also translating, reading Leibniz's with the contemporary Italian artist Michaelangelo Pistoletto's formulation of canvas infinita, which I find resembles Leibniz's, the world is not one in which the Subject projects (reflects and recognizes) itself onto everything, as the determining force. It is one in which everything is indeed always already also an expression of everything else in the unique way it can express the world—imagine difference without separability. This is not difficult if you notice how every other article in the field of particle physics describes a plenum similar to Aristotle's description of matter and change: "Changes will be from given states into those contrary to them in several respects. The matter, then, which changes must be capable of both states. And since things are said to be in two ways, everything changes from that which is potentially to that which is actually. . . . Therefore not only can a thing come to be, incidentally, out of that which is not, but also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, not actually."¹⁰ For potentiality (I prefer the term "virtuality") seems to be precisely what has been puzzling particle physicists throughout the twentieth century. Very successful experiments—from the technological point of view—that fail to find particles obeying efficient causality, as they violate the limits of space-time (the still theoretical tachyon particles that seem to exceed Albert Einstein's speed of light limit), determinacy (Werner Heisenberg's disturbing finding), separability (John Stewart Bell's nonlocality or spooky effects at distance), and sequentiality (also a violation due to quantum entanglement). What interests me is that these elements, *materia prima*, that constitute

(have constituted and will constitute) everything in the universe, the content of every body, violate the modern grammar; they remain Thing. Whatever can be said is said about the object (particle, wave, vibration, emanation of a field)—that is, after measurement—Kant would obviously agree with that! Yet that they can be talked about at all violates the Kantian and the Hegelian programs. My method moves toward description of existence that takes into account both actuality (reality as space-time), but also takes into account virtuality—the world as Matter, that is, Plenum.

How to apprehend the world anew, without separability, determinacy, and sequentiality presumed in the very categories and concepts—that is, the forms of the subject—which are still our critical tools and raw materials? Abstraction or reflection has to go. This is a job for intuition. I am thinking with Hortense Spillers's articulation of the flesh as the ethical ground from which to critically consider conquest and slavery—namely, the wounded flesh exposes total violence as a means that ensures profit and its accumulation through the appropriation of total value, that is, that global capital consists in nothing more than the expropriated productive capacity of slave bodies and Native lands. For the flesh and soil expose the limits of space-time, that is of the (social) scientific and historical accounts of colonial and racial subjugation, which cannot but reproduce what elsewhere I call the racial dialectic. For flesh is no more and no less than what has been (which nourishes us as animal, vegetable, or mineral) and of what has yet to become, that which returns to the soil to be broken down into the nano elements, the particles that emerged at the beginning and remain in the composition of everything that happens and exists in the universe. The Dead's words have ethical force: everything for everyone. For if the flesh holds, as a mark/sign, colonial violence, the Dead's rotting flesh returns this marking to the soil, and the Dead then remain in the very compositions of anything, yes, as matter, raw material, that nourishes the instruments of production, labor, and capital itself. That is how the dead slave/Native lives in/ as capital.

What I am proposing then is an approach to reading, as a materialist practice, one that includes imaging of what happens and has happened as well as what has existed, exists, and will exist otherwise—all and at once. From without the subject and its form, the World, becomes the stage of indeterminacy, that is, of The Thing or matter released from the grips of the forms of the understanding. Beyond Kant's forms and laws (and rules), Hegel's Spirit (whose materiality is also that of phenomena), and the concepts and categories of historical materialism (but as a constituent of Karl

Marx's raw material), all that exists and happens refers to the Thing or prime matter. I'll conclude with a comment on the kind of onto-epistemological departure that reading history from the horizon of death demands.

"By the General Law of Value . . ."

If the value of 40 lbs. of yarn = the value of 40 lbs. of cotton + the value of a whole spindle, i.e., if the same working-time is required to produce the commodities on either side of this equation, then 10 lbs. of yarn are an equivalent for 10 lbs. of cotton, together with one-fourth of a spindle. In the case we are considering the same working-time is materialised in the 10 lbs. of yarn on the one hand, and in the 10 lbs. of cotton and the fraction of a spindle on the other.

—Karl Marx, *Capital*, vol. 1

What is it about modern grammar that renders the Zapatista Dead's words without political (in the strict meaning of addressing the state) significance (both as meaning and value), transforming them into expressions of beliefs that refer to a time before exposure to Europeans, their reason, and the tools and modalities of violence it justifies? When I turn to the original presentation of the historical materialist text, I find how the pillars of modern thought that sustain reason's ruling render the Dead's words incomprehensible.¹¹ This is not loss because that incomprehensibility also exposes how transcendental reason has not been able to comprehend everything, the Thing, or matter. Post-Enlightenment Reason comprehends what it engulfs, which is only what separability, determinacy, and sequentiality can work with, and which is always already translated as form, more precisely as temporal (historical or social) ones that, in the historical materialist text, for instance, are figured as juridical devices, such as title and contract.

For example, here is how it appears when, deploying a Black feminist reading device, which I call blacklight, I try to find an answer for an obvious question in Marx's presentation of the theory of value in *Capital*, volume 1, chapter 7.¹² The question: How is it that slavery and conquest are only relevant as moments of primitive accumulation (violent preconditions) and not as crucial to the ongoing accumulation of (industrial and financial) capital in the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century and beyond? If there is something upon which Marxists do not disagree it is that labor time materialized in a commodity accounts for its exchange value. What most do not question is what happens to the materialized labor in the commodities

that enter as raw material (cotton) and instrument of production (the iron used in the spindle). What happens to these materializations of slave labor in Virginia and Minas Gerais working on conquered (Indigenous) lands (cotton) and extracted (gold) from conquered lands? My point with these questions is that if one accepts determinacy, as it operates in the attribution of productivity to human activity—that is, that social labor time determines value—why is the claim not taken seriously that accumulated (exchange) value that constitutes global capital includes both the surplus value appropriated from the wage (contract) labor and the total value yielded by slave (title) labor on colonized lands. The answer is because exchange value is measured “by the quantity of labour expended on and materialized in [a commodity], by the working-time necessary, under given social conditions, for its production.”¹³ Unfortunately, my claim is incomprehensible—much like the Zapatistas’ Dead—because it refuses determinacy (and sequentiality) in the differentiation (separation) of social conditions.

Let me explain how determinacy operates in both moments. First, it appears in Marx’s statements on the production of value in his consideration of the “labour process independent of the particular form it takes under given social conditions.”¹⁴ I am not refusing this deployment of determinacy here for the sake of this argument because doing so would break with the basic tenet of historical materialism. This would defeat the purpose of this chapter, which is to challenge the disavowal of slave labor as productive of exchange value. In any event, determinacy operates here in two distinctions: (a) when considering the “labor process” in general, between labor and its objects (means of production or instruments of production): land, raw materials, and so forth; that is, in Marx’s statement that living labor is the sole subject, the productive force: “the soil (and this economically speaking, includes water) . . . is the universal subject [meaning object] of labour;”¹⁵ and (b) in Marx’s argument, when considering labor as a “value-creating activity,” that the labor expended in creating raw materials—such as cotton and iron or gold—is also mere object: “The raw material serves now merely as an absorbent of a definite quantity of labour;” it is changed in the process of spinning (by the labor time in it) into the yarn, which as the product is “nothing more than a measure of the labour absorbed by the cotton.”¹⁶ Under capitalist social conditions of production, the social labor time expended in the production of cotton disappears in the process of production of the yarn; it is used by the spinner. Though it enters in the price the capitalist paid for the cotton and the spindle, it has no significance (explanatory value) to the

exchange value of the commodity, the yarn. In this distinction between the labor process in general and (surplus) value-creating labor, the productive capacity (that is, their capacity to work) of Native lands and enslaved bodies vanishes into/as raw material. They have no part in surplus value, because what counts is living labor time.

Second, the key statement in the explanation of the law of value is the phrase “under certain social conditions.” For *Capital* is also a piece of sociological theorizing, and its main concern is to provide a clear and distinct description of capitalist social conditions, according to the formalizing trust of classical knowledge and the temporal trust of Hegel’s account of history. More important, what distinguishes capital accumulation is the particular historical stage, in which freedom has an economic and juridical shape. It requires “free laborers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own.” Hence, the enslaved laborer picking cotton on the plantations in Virginia or mining in the mountains of Minas Gerais does so under social (economic and juridic) conditions of unfreedom, as “part and parcel of the means of production.”¹⁷

For Marx, they do not enter in the reproduction (accumulation of) capital because the land where the cotton grows and the bodies of those who tend the land and pick the cotton are instruments of production, not dead labor, but raw material. That is, slave labor does not count as dead/past labor. However, because the raw material (cotton and gold) would not exist without it, it enters the calculation of the value of the yarn as an underdetermined element in the conditions of production. At the same time, as such, as raw material, slave labor also differs from the cotton it creates for the production of the yarn. For, as noted above, the cotton is a raw material whose exchange value disappears once living labor transforms it into an elementary component of the yarn—that is, when it realizes its use value. But the price of the slave’s labor is already surplus value and his/her labor is extracted, rather than willfully applied to its subjects. More important, the slave is presented as a raw material given by nature, like the soil (land and water), and not one that is in itself use value (that is the product of past labor).¹⁸

“In slave-labor,” Marx argues, “even that part of the working-day in which the slave is only replacing the value of his own means of existence, in which, therefore, in fact, he works for himself alone, appears as labor for his master. All the slave’s labor appears as unpaid labor. In wage-labor, on the contrary,

even surplus labor, or unpaid labor, appears as paid. There the property-relation conceals the labor of the slave for himself; here the money-relation conceals the unrequited labor of the wage-laborer.”¹⁹ Evidently, if one accepts this second operation of determinacy, in the differentiation of social conditions of production, my claim that the accumulated surplus value that constitutes capital contains the total value yielded by slaves laboring on Native lands is absolute nonsense. But it is nonsense, it seems, precisely because the settler slave owner did expropriate the *total value*.

Though necessity guides the original presentation of historical materialism, its formulation of labor rests on the concept of freedom (as a descriptor of social conditions)—in the two senses Marx highlights above, from land (and other means of production) and to enter into a contract. The juridical forms of title and contract, respectively, account for the determination of two kinds of labor: slave labor, which as raw material, an object, as an instrument of production does not produce exchange value, and *wage labor*, which, even if dispossessed, remains a subject, free and equal. This is what renders my case nonsense, not the statement that slave owners expropriated the total value produced by slave labor in Native lands. What to do? To move to dissolve the categories of historical materialism. If we are to apprehend the words of the Dead (the Native and the slave), our political imagination must learn how to do without separability, sequentiality, and determinacy.

In Lieu of a Conclusion—Reading as Re(De)compositional Practice

Now listen!! What are the Zapatistas’ Dead saying? What is in the demand that does distinguish a subject (everyone is us) and an object (everything or nothing), or I and Other: “For everyone, everything,” say our dead. “Until it is so, there will be nothing for us.” Heed the call from the Zapatistas’ Dead, who speak history in the voice of the earth, their flesh and blood nurturing the mountains and rivers of the Mexican southeast, demanding everything to everyone or nothing, the return of the total value yielded by Native lands and slave labor; calling for the end of the rule of state-capital; because global capital is postcolonial capital, that is, it lives off the value yielded by the productive capacity of Native lands and slave bodies, so that the end of the anticolonial struggles, decolonization, will only be accomplished if the line separating the colonial present from the colonial past is erased because this is the only way to seize the colonial future.

What is it that the Dead call for? Listening to the Dead requires seizing the spatiality and temporality that constitute Hegelian and Marxian

formulations of the dialectical. Heeding the call of these insurgencies against state-capital, I am convinced, requires a materialist perspective that can answer to the Zapatistas' Dead call for decolonization, or as I prefer, the end of the world as we know it. Emphasis on know! For what the Dead's words and the Zapatistas' reply presumes is an in/distinction between Thing, One, Us—thus violating the basic rules of modern grammar, namely separability, determinacy, and sequentiality.²⁰ For the Dead (speaking in the mountains and forests) there is no distinction between everything, everyone, and us, no separability (extension and its related attributes, such as solidity), that is. No separation between the Dead and us and everything (what is happened and what is happening), no sequentiality, that is. These functions of our political grammar are presupposed in descriptions of the state and its legal borders and common history and social subjects. A Black feminist poethical reading is a kind of radical imaging; it is a compositional method that attends to matter not toward comprehending it in the fixed forms of the understanding or subsuming it to the idea(l)s of Reason. While a tool for critique, Black feminist poethical reading consists in a confrontational method that erases the distinction between the actual and the virtual, as it presupposes that, beyond space-time, all that happens and exists is deeply implicated. As a mode of critical intervention, it is creative in that it images the World as having always already been otherwise than its modern picturing. That is, its deployment of the figural (against the formal) unsettles the onto-epistemological pillars that sustain critical projects derived from the Kantian program. Reading the Dead is imaging, with an intention, a manner of composing and recomposing what is given (global capital) so as to expose fissures through which possibilities can be contemplated and with what is not necessarily followed by what is supposed to come.

As a practice, a praxis, it foregrounds the intuition and the imagination. What do I mean by the intuition? Let's take Kant's description of cognition, in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, in which he identifies three faculties: apprehending (*attentio*), abstracting (*abstratio*), and reflecting (*reflexio*).²¹ Apprehension, which is the task of the senses, Kant states, receives "representations in order to produce intuitions" that, because these are already in time and space, become the material for the other two: abstraction takes away "what is common to several of these intuitions in order to produce the concept," and reflection uses the concepts in order to produce cognition of the object" or a judgment.²² That is, intuitive knowledge (that of impressions/expressions) is always already subjected to discursive knowledge (that of conceptions). Walter Benjamin and Henri Bergson provide counter

accounts of intuition as a mode of knowing. However, I do not think, with Bergson, that “what is unique” in an object is inexpressible. I prefer Benjamin’s account of the intuition in his *Doctrine of the Similar*, which is like his image: “The perception of similarity is in every case bound to an instantaneous flash. It slips past, can possibly be regained, but really cannot be held fast, unlike other perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as fleetingly and transitorily as a constellation of stars.” Here he also describes language as a the embodiment of previous (a thousand years old) practices of intuitive knowledge: “Language is the highest application of the mimetic faculty: a medium into which the earlier perceptive capabilities for recognizing the similar had entered without residue, so that it is now language which represents the medium in which objects meet and enter into relationship with each other, no longer directly . . . but in their essences, in their most volatile and delicate substances, even in their aromata.”²³ Imaging/reading names a method aimed at what is without space-time, but which seeps through as/in language, if it is not conceived as a set of rules but as expression. Language, indeed! I conclude with an invitation to contemplate descriptors of existence that do no reduce it to space-time and the play of its onto-epistemological pillars, namely separability, determinacy, and sequentiality, which translate the Dead’s words into the actualization of cultural difference and render the statement that “global capital is post/colonial capital” nonsense.

Notes

- 1 Vásquez, “Study on Extractive Industries in Mexico.”
- 2 Vásquez, “Study on Extractive Industries in Mexico,” 8.
- 3 Vásquez, “Study on Extractive Industries in Mexico,” 7.
- 4 Vásquez, “Study on Extractive Industries in Mexico,” 7.
- 5 Vásquez, Study on Extractive Industries in Mexico, 10.
- 6 Simpson, *As We Have Always Done*.
- 7 For a history of Idle No More, see <http://www.idlenomore.ca/story>.
- 8 For more information on the Encontro Unitário dos Trabalhadores movement, see <https://encontrounitario.wordpress.com>.
- 9 I would here refer to Jared Sexton’s comments on the Zapatista’s call. Even though Sexton does not cite this piece (Reading the Dead)—which I presented as a talk (at which he was present) at the University of California, Irvine, in March 2014—or the Zapatistas’ declaration, for that matter, I am sure that he is also responding to my call for decolonization: Sexton, “The *Vel* of Slavery: Tracking the Figure of the Unsovereign,” 11. In particular, I would like to highlight that the call for decolonization is not one for “radical redistribution”—which would keep it within the liberal grammar. It is a call

- for the return of the total value extracted under total violence, which includes the very American (Indigenous) and African (enslaved) lives that were taken as well as the pasts, presents, and futures that were no longer because of their obliteration. More important, because the Dead (these lives) remain outside the scenes of economic and ethical value, there can be no hierarchy—vertically (spatially) or horizontally (temporally) presented—of suffering attached to the demand for decolonization.
- 10 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Kindle version location 3660. Downloaded from <https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/metaphysics/index.html>. Last accessed September 27, 2018.
 - 11 This should be preceded by the following: Just imagine that I have just finished a review of how the presumption of separability informs the modern grammar, in particular how it sustains determinacy in Kant's account of knowledge, and sequentiality in Hegel's description of the movement of history. Separability—the ontic state presupposed in efficient causality—guides the original presentation of the historical materialist and is at work in all its concepts and categories. It explains both the relation between the subject and its object (Kant's determinacy) and (internal/self-relation that is) the movement of history (Hegel's sequentiality).
 - 12 A version of the argument presented in this section has been published in Silva, "Unpayable Debt."
 - 13 Marx, *Capital. Volume I*, 208.
 - 14 Marx, *Capital. Volume I*, 197.
 - 15 Marx, *Capital. Volume I*, 198–99.
 - 16 Marx, *Capital. Volume I*, 211.
 - 17 Marx, *Capital. Volume I*, 785.
 - 18 Implicated here are, of course, the works of Silvia Federici and Hortense Spillers.
 - 19 Marx, *Capital, Volume I*, 591.
 - 20 For a discussion of these terms, see Denise Ferreira da Silva, "On Difference without Separability."
 - 21 Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 27.
 - 22 Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 249.
 - 23 Benjamin, "Doctrine of the Similar," 68.

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